Research

Most choices are based on information about the available options. A large body of research documents, however, that the same information is often perceived and evaluated differently depending on the prevailing context. Moreover, seemingly identical contextual information, such as previously seen products or job applicants, have been shown to exert opposing influences on perceptions of the same information about a “target” product or job applicant. Inspired by insights from neuroscience and psychophysics, I propose a unifying framework that can parsimoniously reconcile the seemingly contradictory influences of contextual information. This framework generates a novel set of predictions for how properties of the contextual information and the target, such as the perceived uncertainty in both and the perceived discrepancy between them, can be manipulated to affect perceptions and decisions. The framework yields testable implications for a wide range of decision domains, such as the perceived attractiveness of products and services, the evaluation of job applicants, the perceived acceptability of wages, or the perceived trustworthiness of politicians. Based on an experiment on risky investment decisions, I document how decisions can be changed as predicted by the framework through appropriately manipulating several properties of the context and the target.  

In many markets, firms make their products complex through add-on features, thus making them difficult to evaluate and compare. Does this product obfuscation lure buyers into buying overpriced products, and if so, why does competition not eliminate this practice? More generally, under which conditions can sellers enforce stable obfuscation levels in a competitive environment such that they can increase their profits at the buyers’ expense? We show – based on competitive experimental markets – that add-ons that merely complicate the products render obfuscation quite fragile because buyers display an aversion against complex products. However, if add-ons are surplus-enhancing, sellers can mitigate competition via obfuscation which generates substantial profits and persistent dispersion in headline and add-on prices. Sellers anticipate that obfuscation limits the buyers’ depth and breadth of search, and they exploit this by hiding unattractive product features. Therefore, even the best product in the market is priced above marginal cost and buyers persistently fail to find the best product in the market such that inferior products have a good chance of being traded. We also identify the causal impact of obfuscation opportunities on profits and price dispersion because if we remove obfuscation opportunities, overall prices quickly converge to marginal cost. Thus, surplus-enhancing obfuscation opportunities cause persistent price dispersion, facilitate stable profits and reduce buyers’ share of the surplus.

Previous literature notes that more equal societies seem to be associated with higher social capital that potentially contributes to better economic outcomes such as reduced transaction costs and increased efficiency in economic exchange. However, previous evidence on the relationship between inequality and social capital is correlational. In this study, we implement an experiment in which groups are exogenously exposed to redistribution policies that generate variation in group equality, allowing us to, within the setting of the laboratory, causally explore the impact of group inequality on group social capital. Each group’s social capital is mainly measured by cooperativeness, trust, and trustworthiness within the groups, and we also complement our analyses by eliciting group members’ own beliefs, distributional preferences, and attitudes towards other members. We find that groups with progressive redistribution policies feel significantly more cohesive with other members, but groups with regressive redistribution policies care significantly less about other members’ payoffs. However, social capital measured by group members’ trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation are not significantly affected by redistributive policies. 

Ambiguous prospects are ubiquitous in social and economic life, but the psychological foundations of behavior under ambiguity are still not well understood. One of the most robust empirical regularities is the strong correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk which suggests that compound risk aversion may provide a psychological foundation for ambiguity aversion. However, compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also be independent psychological phenomena, but what would then explain the strong correlation between attitudes towards compound risk and ambiguity? We tackle these questions by training a treatment group’s ability to reduce compound to simple risks, and analyzing how this affects their compound risk and ambiguity attitudes in comparison to a control group who is taught something unrelated to reducing compound risk. We find that aversion to compound risk disappears almost entirely in the treatment group, while the aversion towards both artificial and natural sources of ambiguity remains high and is basically unaffected by the teaching of how to reduce compound lotteries. Moreover, similar to previous studies, we observe a strong correlation between compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, but this correlation only exists in the control group while in the treatment group it is rather low and no longer significant. These findings suggest that compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion do not share the same psychological foundations: while compound risk aversion is primarily generated by a form of bounded rationality – the inability to reduce compound lotteries – ambiguity aversion is unrelated to this inability, suggesting that ambiguity aversion may be a genuine preference in its own right. 

A rapidly growing literature has been attempting to measure the strength of inequity aversion preferences as accurately as possible. We vary two factors that might affect the accuracy of the measurement of inequity aversion preference, i.e., choice sets with different underlying inequity aversion strength ranges and with different relative income inequities while absolute income inequities remain fixed. We find that unidirectional changes in the choice sets for disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion preferences significantly bias the measured strength of both preferences in the same directions of the changes and that the variance in inequity aversion increases with the range of choice sets. Moreover, a decrease in relative income inequity raises the measured strength of advantageous inequity aversion but does not affect disadvantageous inequity aversion preference.